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The Digital Video Recorder:
Unbundling Advertising and Content
Randal C Pickert
Next time you turn on your television, actually watch the commercials and you will quickly see how poorly the economic model of
TV is working. They put on a commercial for dog food, but you are allergic to dogs, a commercial for diapers, but, mercifully, your kids are
old enough that you no longer need to decide whether Pampers are
better than Huggies. Many of the commercials are for product categories that you do not purchase; others are for products, such as cars or
computers, that you use constantly but purchase only sporadically.
Most ads are targeted at no more than the broad side of the barn:
Adults 18-49 or Women 25-54 or some other rough demographic segment.
We are at a point where this model can be altered dramatically.
The digital video recorder (DVR)-the best-known names are TiVo
and ReplayTV-takes home-taping of TV programs to a new level by
dropping the tapes used by the VCR and recording instead to a hard
disk. The continuing, dramatic drop in the cost of a gigabyte of storage
makes it possible to switch from clunky tapes to smooth digital storage. Plus, the DVR comes with software to make it much easier to record your favorite shows: tell it to record Friends forever and it will.
The DVR also promises that we never need watch another commercial, and some versions of ReplayTV make it possible to redistribute
copied programs to other viewers.
It would be easy to dismiss the DVR as just an updated VCR and
to assume that we should apply the same rules to both. But responses
to drops in transaction costs can be highly nonlinear. As Napster and
its successors have made clear, practices tolerated offline-for music,
physical sharing of tapes and CDs-might have dramatically different
consequences when moved online at vastly lower transaction costs.
The DVR is just one manifestation of the possibilities of adding intelt Paul and Theo Leffmann Professor of Commercial Law, The University of Chicago Law
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ligence and easy storage to a box in your living room. In so doing, we
are changing the amount of control that can be exerted over the content on the TV screen. As the tech seers have predicted,' television is
changing from a synchronous medium-you watch content delivered
in real time-to one in which content is captured for viewing at a later
time. The VCR hints at all of this, but the DVR, which substantially
reduces transaction costs relative to the VCR, may very well realize
these changes.
But the DVR-and I will use this as a convenient shorthand for a
device with intelligence and storage that intermediates television delivery-is much more than just a souped-up VCR. Smart devices such
as the DVR will allow us to unbundle content and advertising. Content that comes from broadcasters bundled in one form-the TV
show itself, the station identifications, the ads selling Budweiser, and
the promos for a very special Dawson's Creek-can be reshaped and
separated before the viewer sees it. The kill-the-commercials feature
of some DVRs is just one approach to this, and one that could matter:
unbundling could put at risk the basic financing model for adsupported TV. Jamie Kellner, then head of Turner Broadcasting Systems, infamously described the commercial-skipping feature of the
DVR as "theft": "Your contract with the network when you get the
show is you're going to watch the spots. Otherwise you couldn't get
the show on an ad-supported basis. Any time you skip a commercial
...you're

actually stealing the programming."2 Kellner did say that it

was fine to go to the bathroom during commercials-or more precisely and more begrudgingly, that "I guess there's a certain amount
of tolerance for going to the bathroom."'
But in truth, you need not adopt Kellner's out-there views to acknowledge that a perfect ad-zapping technology would drastically alter the extent of free TV. We know the place of TV in the United
States: other than sleep and work, Americans spend more time watching TV than doing anything else. TV is the main source of news and
information, which magnifies its importance in a democracy. TV advertising is also a $54.4 billion-per-year industry, which puts it
squarely in the middle of the wheels of commerce.! If the DVR really
I
2

See, for example, Nicholas Negroponte, Being Digital 168-69 (Alfred A. Knopf 1995).
Interview of Jamie Kellner, VOD's Ad-Skipping Irks Kellner, in Staci D. Kramer, Con-

tent's King, Cable World 32 (Apr 29,2002).
3
Id.
4
Barbara Brock, Life without TV: Filling Those Four Hours with More Satisfying Leisure,
Parks & Recreation 68, 69 (Nov 2002) ("On average, Americans watch TV more than four
hours a day."). Brock also notes that Americans spend 40 percent of their leisure time watching
television. Id.
5 See William H. Donald, Standard & Poor's Industry Surveys: Advertising 3 (May 29.
2003).
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is the end of the TV commercial, the rapid spread of DVRs will overturn the basic structure of broadcast TV.
At least as important, the unbundling of ads and content allows
personalization of commercials, and that in turn may change content
itself. Personalization will make commercials much more valuable: we
will stop getting ads for products we will never purchase or are not
ready to purchase soon. We could move from a world in which one of
ten commercials is of interest to a hit rate of nine out of ten. If you
think that is unrealistic, think of advertising in specialty magazinescomputers, cameras, or cars. And in a competitive market, more effective commercials should mean fewer commercials: they do not need
to make you watch ten ads to get the one meaningful ad in front of
you.
But more importantly, personalization will change the core role
that content plays in intermediating between advertisers and audiences. Advertisers care enormously about their audiences. For advertising-supported content, the content creator is a middleman, an intermediary in the two-sided market made up of audiences and advertisers. In a world in which content and ads are bound together, my ads
get only to individuals who are interested in the content to which the
ads are tied. Grab the remote and flip through the specialized cable
networks. The ads on the Food Network are quite different from those
on Fox Sports World. Content is shaped to attract an audience with
particular demographics so that ads can be targeted at them. Content
mediates the union of advertisers and audience.
Intelligent devices that mediate content-smart TVs or standalone boxes such as the DVR-have the capacity to subvert the critical matching process played by content creators. If instead I can unbundle ads from the content-if I can tailor TV commercials to your
personal characteristics-all that matters is that the viewer is there to
watch the ad. For the advertiser, the content is not the point, the ads
are. If TV test patterns emerged to succeed reality-based TV shows,
advertisers would not care at all, so long as viewers watched the
commercials that "interrupted" the test patterns.
We can imagine these choices in the most concrete terms possible. You pay for TV directly on your cable bill or you pay for it by
having commercials interrupt the shows that you watch. So you turn
on the TV to watch a show. Before you can watch, you are presented
with a choice: pay a set fee to watch the show commercial-free or get
the show for free with commercials. Of course, they cannot make you
watch the commercials-just as they cannot now-but, absent legal
That obviously oversimplifies: advertisers care about whether their ads are going to be
6
well received and believe that program context matters for the warmth of the reception. See C.
Edwin Baker, Advertising and a Democratic Press 62-64 (Princeton 1994).
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controls regarding the privacy of information about individuals, they
will know exactly who you are and should be able to offer commercials for products that you might actually care about. At the same
time, the DVR, acting as a broker, says to potential advertisers, "here
are the personal characteristics of this viewer in Chicago, Illinois; how
much will you pay to reach him?"
But this model works only if we can easily separate ad-supported
viewers from fee-paying viewers (whether those viewers pay per view
or through a monthly subscription fee). If we cannot-if viewers can
"offer" to watch commercials and then use TiVo to delete them-then
we may have to move to a one-size-fits-all model for TV, where all TV
is paid for on a subscription basis. How the technology is organized
will almost certainly help to determine whether viewers can commit
to retaining the ads. Decentralized, free-standing DVRs-the current
model-will make commitment difficult. Centralizing the DVR technology in the pipes bringing the content into your home-putting the
DVR technology in the cable box-may make the ad commitments
more credible. The range of possible, supportable economic models
turns directly on how the DVR technology is organized and those
models matter directly for the kind of content that will be made available.
In many ways, the central question for advertising-supported
content is who controls the bundle of content and ads. Until recently,
consumers of content could select only from the bundles offered to
them; they had no direct ability to unbundle. Intermediaries-such as
cable companies, or more recently, satellite providers-could have
unbundled or rebundled content, but were expressly barred from doing so by law.7 With the increasing intelligence of display devices, we
now face across-the-board the issue of how content and advertising
bundles are presented.
And as we turn more directly to law, to situate the DVR, compare it with the VCR and cable. We litigated how copyright law applied to the VCR in Sony Corp of America v Universal City Studios,

Inc,' and stopped there; we have never passed legislation to control
the VCR. The regulation of cable also started as a copyright problem,
arising when cable was community access TV (CATV) and did nothing more than grab broadcasts from the skies using large, shared antennae to forward TV broadcasts to subscribers. Like the VCR, we
litigated (with the Supreme Court eventually ruling that CATV did
7
See 17 USC § 1I1(c)(3) (2000) (providing that "the secondary transmission to the public by a cable system of a performance ... in a primary transmission made by a broadcast station
... is actionable as an act of infringement ... if the content ... is in any way willfully altered by
the cable system"); 17 USC § 501 (providing remedies for infringement under §§ 106-21).
8 464 US 417 (1984).
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not violate copyright law)' but we also regulated TV intermediation,
with a mix of copyright, statutory compulsory licenses, must-carry obligations, and retransmission consent rules.'
Given the importance of commercials in financing free broadcast
TV, the legal responses to both the VCR and cable as broadcast forwarders unsurprisingly paid close attention to what happened to the
commercials. As we turn to regulating the DVR, we will move down
the same path, first considering how current law applies and then
whether new laws are required. How the technology is organized
turns out to be quite important. Standard legal instruments such as
copyright or contract work only so well with widespread, decentralized use of a technology. Centralized technology is easier to control,
either through contract; through common law doctrines such as contributory copyright infringement, the tack tried in Sony; or through
direct regulation, as we have done with cable. The regulatory path for
the DVR probably turns on whether it emerges as a decentralized
technology (A la the VCR) or as part of the cable/satellite system.
And, if the DVR technology is centralized, as many forecast, we may
see a substantial asymmetry between broadcast and cable. The dispute
over "must carry" will morph into a fight over "must store" or "must
be smart" as over-the-air broadcasters will seek access to the storage
and intelligence that will come to reside in the set-top box.
I. REGULATING CONTENT INTERMEDIARIES

To help situate the DVR, consider four related situations, each of
which addresses rules for the permissible behavior of a content intermediary: telephone directory covers in the 1920s; less obscurely, the
litigation over the VCR in Sony; the dispute over ad-swapping on
VCR tapes; and finally, the regulation of cable TV. What I find interesting here is how we see recurring conflicts over advertising bundling
and yet a wide variety of legal responses to those conflicts.
A.

Telephone Directory Covers

In the 1924 case National Telephone Directory Co v Dawson
Manufacturing Co," Southwestern Bell Telephone distributed a telephone directory in St. Louis. The directory came with paid ads sprinkled throughout, and, most prominently, ads on the front, back, and
spine of the directory. The Chase Hotel in St. Louis entered into a
9
Fortnightly Corp v United Artists Television, Inc, 392 US 390, 399-401 (1968); Teleprompter Corp v Columbia BroadcastingSystem, Inc. 415 US 394,408-09 (1974).
M For a general discussion of this regime, see John Thorne, Peter W. Huber, and Michael
K. Kellogg, Federal BroadbandLaw ch 10 (Little, Brown 1995).
11 214 Mo App 683,263 SW 483,485 (Mo Ct App 1924).
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deal with the Dawson Manufacturing Company in which Dawson
would produce wrap-around covers for the telephone directories to
be placed in the hotel rooms. Dawson would find advertisers for the
spots on the covers, thereby covering up Southwestern Bell's ads. The
Chase Hotel was the last mover in this situation. Quite literally, it
acted as gatekeeper to its hotel rooms-both for guests and the advertisers seeking access to them. It physically placed telephone directories in its rooms and thus was in a position to put a cover on the directories. Chase could insert its own ads and substantially diminish
the value of the ads arranged by Southwestern Bell.
This is not a situation in which we need to be concerned about
the creation incentives for the work in question. Southwestern Bell
was going to create a directory even if it could not control the cover
revenues. The telephone directory is a key way of getting people to
use the telephone-it complements the phone system. It is also true
that protecting Southwestern Bell from entry in the cover market
would increase its revenues, but so would allowing it to charge more
for phone service. The real focus here is on maximizing the value of
the cover: we can have only one cover for the phone book, and the
question is who gets to decide which cover is bound to-that is, bundled with-the content on the inside.
In many ways, this is just a case about contracts and prices.
Southwestern Bell and Chase were dealing with each other directly.
Southwestern Bell could have specified in its contract with Chase that
Chase would not add covers to the directories. Of course, as the phone
company, Southwestern's contract terms may have been limited by
regulations. If the underlying legal rule barred Chase from adding
covers to the directories, Chase would need to pay Southwestern Bell
for the right to add covers. It might make sense to do that if, by adding
covers, Chase could tailor the cover ads to the demographics of the
average Chase customer. By contrast, if any last mover could lawfully
add covers to the directories, Southwestern Bell would need to cut
deals with each last mover regarding covers, an expensive proposition
that would probably force Southwestern Bell to foreclose this possibility through contract or the tariffs setting forth the terms under
which it provided services.
As I hope that suggests, we probably should assign the "property
right" in the cover to Southwestern Bell. I use the term "property
right" loosely, as the actual rule might be implemented through contract or regulation. The default assignment is based on the guess-and
it is nothing more than that-that we will see relatively few situations
in which last movers can profitably tailor ads to their local audience,
and that we should therefore impose on these last movers the burden
to negotiate around the initial entitlement. The relative cost of nego-
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tiating around the property right is a key reason for structuring property rights in the first instance. Southwestern Bell was distributing
roughly 140,000 copies of the telephone directory, while Chase was
taking a few hundred (and we can expect there to be few last movers
in Chase's ad-tailoring position); it seems sensible to vest the property
right in Southwestern Bell.
In the case as litigated, the court found that Chase was engaging
in unfair competition. This is an old doctrine with uncertain boundaries, but here unfair competition law is being used as a way of assigning property rights. By finding Chase and the directory company to
have competed unfairly in adding the directory covers, the court assigned the property right in the covers to Southwestern Bell.'2 That in
turn structured the negotiations over the covers. Last movers who
wanted to tailor ads would have to buy that right from Southwestern
Bell. And also note the way in which the legal doctrine matters: a pure
contracts approach would work between Southwestern Bell and
Chase, but if the directory cover company is really the moving force
here, Southwestern Bell did not already have a contract with Dawson.
B.

The VCR

In Sony, Universal Studios and Disney sued Sony for contributory copyright infringement caused by consumer copying of TV programs using a VCR. Third-party liability for copyright infringement
turns first on finding the primary party liable for copyright infringement, and second on finding a basis for extending that liability to the
third party. Here, of course, that would mean liability for a consumer
using a VCR to tape programs.
The Court in Sony announced its now famous (infamous?) test
for evaluating third-party liability- namely, that the sale of copying
equipment does not constitute contributory infringement so long as
the product is "merely [ ] capable of substantial noninfringing uses.""
I have criticized this test elsewhere and will not pursue that here." The
Court also found that private noncommercial time-shiftingrecording a TV show for later home use-is a fair use and hence does
not constitute copyright infringement. Under the statute, a fair use
finding turns on an analysis of a number of subsidiary factors, includ-

12 See 464 US at 485. But see New England Telephone & Telegraph Co v National Merchandising Corp, 335 Mass 658, 141 NE2d 702 (1957) (holding that a similar scheme did not violate copyright law).
13 Idat442.
14 See Randal C. Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution, 47
Antitrust Bull 423,442-62 (2002).
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ing the "effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work."'"
The content creators argued that home-taping would reduce the
market value of their works by making commercials less effective.
Like the dispute between Southwestern Bell and the Chase Hotel,
content creators were concerned that the last mover-here the home
viewer-would avoid the commercials bundled with the content.
Careful tapers might not record commercials at all, while other viewers might fast-forward over ads when replaying a program. But these
arguments did not carry the day. On the evidence presented in the district court, 92 percent of the shows were recorded with commercials."'
That number seems surprisingly low when you consider the mechanics of "avoiding" the commercials: watch the show live, pause recording when the commercials start, and resume recording when the
commercials end. As to pure playback, 25 percent of watchers fastforwarded through the ads.'7 And, of course, these numbers do not
capture the marginal effect of the VCR on ad watching: did these
committed ad avoiders watch ads before the VCR?
The result in Sony meant that VCR manufacturers were free to
continue without making any payments to content creators. Money, of
course, is exactly what the content creators wanted: as the majority
opinion notes, the copyright holders would have been willing to accept a compulsory license of their works for copying in exchange for a
royalty on VCR sales.' Unlike the telephone directory example where
Southwestern Bell and the Chase Hotel could negotiate directly, it
would have been impossible to undertake individualized negotiations
with end users regarding commercial deletion. A practical compensation mechanism would need to be tied to VCR sales or to sales of
blank tapes. In Europe, many countries introduced a combination of
equipment and blank medium levies to create funds to compensate
copyright holders. In fact, Germany introduced such a program as
early as 1965."
VCR Tapes

C.

Paramount broke new ground in March 1987 when it released
the video for Top Gun: the video included a Diet Pepsi commercial
that played before the movie.2" It did not take long for a new entrant
15

17 USC § 107(4).

16 Sony, 464 US at 453 n 36.
17 Id.
18 Id at 441 n21.

19 See Tarja Koskinen-Olsson, Reprography and the Private Copy, online at
www.kopiosto.fi/tiedotus/Reprogrphy.htm (visited Jan 10,2004).
20
See Bruce Horovitz, Marketing: Pepsi Earns Wings in Home Video, LA Times § 4 at 9
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to emerge: commercial add-on companies. These companies, bridging
the divide between advertisers and video rental retailers, would take a
video tape distributed by Paramount and add commercials at the beginning of the tapes. In some cases, the added commercials were written on blank lead-in tape; in other cases, the new commercial overwrote the copyright notice or even the Pepsi commercials that Paramount included with the tapes."
This situation created a mess for Paramount. Obviously, if the
add-on company overwrote the original ad, Paramount could not sell
that tape space to Pepsi. It would be as if I tried to sell you a billboard
and you knew full well that someone else could plaster their ad over it
immediately. Even without the direct overwrite, Paramount had a
problem, as the add-on companies were adding commercials for
products that competed with Pepsi; Paramount's contract with Pepsi
specified that Paramount would not include ads on the tapes for such
products, a form of exclusivity common in advertising.
The add-on company is another example of a last mover. It acted
as a gatekeeper and sat in the middle between the advertiser and the
video rental store. Paramount sued one of the add-on firms, Video
Broadcasting Systems (VBS), alleging, among other things, two theories of copyright liability: first, that VBS had mutilated its work; and
second, that VBS had created a derivative work, something that only
the copyright holder, Paramount, would be allowed to do.22 The mutilation claim has its roots in the continental concept of droit moral, the
"moral right ... of the artist to have his work attributed to him in the
form in which he created it."2' It should come as no surprise that the
court in Paramountfound it difficult to take seriously how that lofty
notion might apply to swapping an ad for a local pizza joint with a
Diet Pepsi commercial on the Top Gun video tape."'
The derivative work claim was no more successful. Copyright law
assigns exclusive control over "derivative" works to the owner of the
original copyright." So, for example, J.K. Rowling has exclusive control over sequels to the first Harry Potter book. But should we think
of the revised tape-the new commercial plus Top Gun-as a new
(Feb 24, 1987).
21 Paramount Pictures Corp v Video Broadcasting Systems, Inc, 724 F Supp 808, 812 (D
Kan 1989).
22
Id.
23
Gilliam v American Broadcasting Cos Inc, 538 F2d 14, 24 (2d Cir 1976) (stating that
while American copyright law does not recognize "moral rights or provide a cause of action for
their violation," the economic policy underlying copyright depends on granting artists relief "for
mutilation or misrepresentation of their work to the public," and thus courts have long found
room for such claims "outside the statutory law of copyright, such as [in] contract law, or the tort
of unfair competition").
24 Paramount,724 F Supp at 819.
25
17 USC § 106(2).
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work that is derivative of Top Gun? Probably not. Adding a commercial at the beginning should not be seen as sufficiently original as to
make the commercial-plus-movie a new copyrighted work. If no new
copyrightable work has been created, then Paramount's exclusive derivative work right was not violated. After VBS worked with the tape,
Top Gun emerged unchanged: Tom Cruise still flew airplanes and
chased Kelly McGillis. Note that the focus on originality as simply a
doctrinal matter slips over the more troublesome questions of precisely what should determine the scope of the derivative work right
and what guidance we should give to judges in implementing that
principle.
Like Southwestern Bell, Paramount also asserted an unfair
competition claim, but that idea lacks traction when detailed
contracts are possible. VBS had obviously entered into a deal with the
local retailers to add the local commercials. With Paramount just
selling the tapes without further provisions, copyright's first-sale
doctrine" offered comfort to VBS and the retailers. As technology
changed, however, the studios and the retailers entered into new
contractual arrangements. Originally, studios simply sold tapes to the
retailers, with retailers assuming the risk of uncertain demand. As
technology made it possible for studios to collect information about
actual tape rentals by video stores, the business deal between studios
and retail stores shifted from a sales model to an access model.27 A
studio now can put a bunch of copies of a new movie into the video
store and collect a per-rental fee. The retailer's inventory problem
shrinks considerably. And this new contract between the studio and
the retailer means that the question of local ad insertion could easily
be addressed as just another term of the larger contract.
D. Cable
What we now know as cable TV started as CATV. Think of these
as shared antenna systems with local distribution over a network of
landlines. You and I live in the middle of nowhere and thus get lousy
free broadcast TV reception or none at all. We could each build a very
large antenna to get better reception, but such an antenna could easily
be shared by a number of users. CATV faced many legal uncertainties,
but two were critical. First, did the antenna owner owe anything to the
broadcast stations for the use of their signal? Second, did the antenna

26
See 17 USC § 109(a) (granting the owners of individual copies of protected works the
right to sell or dispose of those copies without the copyright owner's permission).
See Julie Holland Mortimer, The Effects of Revenue-Sharing Contracts on Welfare in
27
Vertically-Separated Markets: Evidence from the Video Rental Industry 1-2 (2001) (unpublished
working paper on file with author).
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owner owe anything to the copyright owners for the use of their con-

tent?
These are basic property right and communications law ques-

tions. Answers in favor of broadcasters or copyright owners obviously
would have made entry substantially more difficult, as, at a minimum,
CATV entrants would have needed to negotiate for rights with many
broadcasters and content owners. Early case law favored the copy-

right owners, but two key Supreme Court decisions established that
cable operators were more like viewers than broadcasters and there-

fore did not "perform" the works that they carried." That regime
lasted less than two years, as the Copyright Act of 1976 reset the rules
for so-called secondary transmissions, treating some unauthorized

transmissions as a copyright infringement but coupling that with a
statutory mandatory licensing scheme. "
Under the license, cable firms pay a statutory fee for the use of
some broadcasts; use without paying the fee is a copyright violation.
The statutory license comes subject to the requirement that the cable

company must preserve the content of the original transmission, including the advertising during, before, and after the program. The
hearings leading to the 1976 Copyright Act make clear that there was
a substantial dispute about the extent to which cable could add value

to advertising in forwarding the over-the-air broadcast programs.NI
Congress ultimately came down on the side of broadcasters in requiring the cable companies to pass through the advertising intact.
But nothing in the statutory license affirmatively required the
cable companies to distribute broadcast content. A separate set of
rules, known as the must-carry rules, addressed this issue. The FCC
first imposed must-carry obligations in the 1960s through regulations,
but those regulations were eventually overturned by the D.C. Circuit
in 1985 and again in 1987 as unconstitutional under the First Amendment." Congress reimposed must-carry in the 1992 Cable Act, 2 and

28 See Teleprompter Corp v Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc, 415 US 394, 408-09
(1974); Fortnightly Corp v United Artists Television, Inc, 392 US 390,400-01 (1968).
29 See 17 USC § 111 (establishing what actions constitute copyright infringement by a cable system and creating a mandatory licensing scheme for cable retransmission of television
broadcasts); 17 USC § 501 (providing a private cause of action for copyright infringement and
giving television stations and other licensees standing to sue cable companies for infringement).
3) See, for example, Letter of Jim Terrell, Chairman, Independent Television Stations, Inc,
to Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier (June 17, 1975), in G. Grossman, ed, 16 Omnibus
Copyright Revision Legislative History: U.S. Congress House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on the Courts Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice Hearings 1975 (Part3)
2032 (Hein 2001).
31 Quincy Cable TV Inc v FCC, 768 F2d 1434 (DC Cir 1985); Century Communications
Corp v FCC, 835 F2d 292 (DC Cir 1987), clarified in 837 F2d 517 (DC Cir 1988).
32 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 §§ 4-5, Pub L No
102-385, 106 Stat 1460, 1471-81,codified at 47 USC §§ 534-35 (2000) (1992 Cable Act).
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the new version was again challenged as a violation of the First
Amendment. Those rules went to the Supreme Court twice before the
court ultimately approved them." Under the current must-carry rules,
the cable operator must broadcast the entire schedule of the local
over-the-air station, including all of the commercials.i' The rules thus
prevent the cable company from acting as a typical last mover-such
as the Chase Hotel, you and I using our VCRs, or the commercial
add-on firms-who otherwise would seek to delete the commercials.
The 1992 Cable Act actually put in place a more complex regime,
as it supplemented the must-carry rules with a new process for "retransmission consent.""5 Every three years, local broadcasters must
choose between exercising their must-carry rights-under which they
get carriage by the cable operator but no money-and negotiating access with the cable operator and possibly seeking payment for the retransmission. This retransmission consent rule created a stronger
property right in the broadcast signal than existed under the 1976
Copyright Act, which had embraced a more circumscribed set of
rights in broadcast signals by allowing mandatory licensing of those
signals. By conferring a property right in the signal, the 1992 Cable
Act pushed toward using contracts to regulate how cable companies
would intermediate local broadcast signals.

II.

EVALUATING THE DIGITAL VIDEO RECORDER

We have just seen five ways in which law may apply to content
intermediaries: (1) unfair competition law can set property rights in
how content can be used; (2) copyright law can be directed at the intermediation device itself, as we saw in Sony; (3) copyright can also be
directed at the result of the intermediation, as we saw with the Top
Gun video tape; (4) contracts can control the use of content, as they
currently do for VHS rentals; or (5) Congress can legislate and its
agents can regulate, as we have seen with cable but did not see, contrary to much of the rest of the world, for the VCR. What will happen
to the DVR?
We should start with some quick statistics. The FCC puts the
number of TV-owning households in the U.S. as of June 2002 at 105.4
million. " Roughly 85 percent of those subscribe to a program service
such as cable or satellite." About 90 percent of TV households have a
33
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc v FCC, 520 US 180 (1997); Turner Broadcasting System, Inc v FCC, 512 US 622 (1994).
34
47 USC § 534(b)(3); 47 CFR § 76.62 (2003).
35 See 1992 Cable Act § 6,106 Stat at 1482-83, codified at 47 USC § 325.
36 Ninth Annual Report in the Matter of Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition
in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming. 17 FCC Rec 26901,26911 (2002).
37

d at 26903.
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VCR." Figures on DVR penetration are less precise. The FCC estimates the number at 1 million." Media reports put the number at 2.4
million, with TiVo itself reporting roughly seven hundred thousand
customers. ' Satellite suppliers have been especially active in moving
to integrate DVR technology into their products, and cable companies are moving to add DVRs to the cable set-top box. Industry analysts forecast robust growth in the DVR market, with roughly 28.6
million households in the United States, or 25 percent of all households, having a DVR by 2008.' The vast majority of these are expected to be units in set-top boxes rather than stand-alone units.
But with a current adoption rate of barely 2 percent, we are at
the early stages of this technology (or maybe it just is not going anywhere). And purchase of a DVR does not equal use. It is hard to be
certain about the facts, but some reports suggest that TiVo households
do 40 percent of their prime-time viewing through TiVo, and that
TiVo watchers skip 70 percent of the commercials. 2 You can probably
multiply with the best of them, so we are currently at a figure for
"lost" commercials of 2 percent x 40 percent x 70 percent, which
translates into slightly more than 0.5 percent of all commercials. But if
we moved quickly to 90 percent penetration (the current figure for
VCRs) or 85 percent penetration (the figure for TV delivery other
than over-the-air) we have a much more significant issue.
The switch from tape to hard disk entails several innovations: superior programmability, the ability to pause live TV shows and then
continue watching them without missing a beat, and the ability to skip
commercials entirely. Updates to the DVR make it possible to distribute a recorded show to friends, assuming, of course, that they also
have the same DVR, though ReplayTV has dropped this feature going forward." Commercial skipping and sending shows to friends attracted the attention of content producers, and in November 2001, a
bunch of the content biggies- including Paramount, Disney, NBC,
Showtime, ABC, CBS, and Viacom-sued SONICblue, the producer
of ReplayTV, alleging copyright violations." On June 6, 2002, the Elec38
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tronic Frontier Foundation countersued, bringing a declaratory judgment action on behalf of ReplayTV owners." Given Sony, the plaintiffs will need to distinguish the analog VCR or litigate to the Supreme Court with the hopes of overturning the Court's original 5-4
decision. Again, I am quite skeptical about Sony, but will not address
that here."
A.

Redistribution Incentives and the Organization of Technology

The mere existence of the lawsuit over redistribution of content
gives some sense of how uncertain copyright doctrines burden entry
into new markets, and the interaction of those doctrines with design
decisions. SONICblue made an interesting choice in adding the "Send
Show" feature to the ReplayTV 4000. The company undoubtedly was
trying to create a network of ReplayTV owners with the hope that the
possibility of sharing shows with others would induce users to prefer
ReplayTV to TiVo. But adding this feature enmeshed this DVR in the
Napster controversy and seemed likely to attract unwanted attention,
as indeed it did, when the lawsuit was filed. (No lawsuit has been filed
against the competing TiVo system, which allows sharing between
TiVos owned by the same person, but not with others' TiVos.) And it
turned out this effort was wasted: SONICblue eventually filed for
bankruptcy and sold its DVR technology, and the new owner has
dropped the redistribution feature.
It was unlikely anyway that the redistribution feature would survive as DVR technology rolled out in large numbers, largely because
the DVR will likely be distributed mostly through cable set-top boxes.
Cable operators will be very sensitive to the revenue consequences of
allowing customers to redistribute content. Redistribution might have
direct consequences for revenues generated by pay-per-view programming or video on demand, but very well might similarly affect
subscriptions for pay channels. The desirability of redistribution plays
out quite differently when the DVR is a stand-alone device. For better
or worse, the cable operators will take account of, in a way that a freestanding DVR maker would not, the potential lost cable revenues
from allowing end-users to redistribute shows. As the fight over redistribution of content makes clear, the identity of the owner or controller of a technology has important consequences for the technology's
development.

copyright infringement, (4) violation of § 553 of the Communications Act, (5) violation of § 605
of the Communications Act, and (6) unfair business practices).
45 See Electronic Frontier Foundation, ReplayTV Users: "We Are Not Thieves;" online at
http://www.eff.org/IP/VideofNewmark-vTurner/20020606_eff-pr.html (visited Jan 10, 2004).
46 See Picker, 47 Antitrust Bull at 442-62 (cited in note 14).
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Commercial Deletion and the Commercial Dilemma

If my analysis is right, the DVR dispute will revolve around advertising. We see here another example of the way in which the move
from analog to digital technology reduces transaction costs and puts
pressure on the old business model. The DVR lowers the cost of
deleting commercials relative to a standard VCR or even relative to
an analog dual-head VCR. The plaintiffs in the ReplayTV suit are
quite plausibly right in thinking that if we all had free-standing DVRs,
the current financing model for free broadcast TV would be toast.
That model is one that lives and dies on commercials, and absent
making us want to watch commercials-as many advertisers clearly
do-no watching of commercials means no free TV.
Maybe there is a shared interest in making it difficult to skip
commercials. Indeed, deleting-versus-watching commercials may very
well be a classic prisoners' dilemma: I want you to watch commercials
rather than having to watch them myself, but I cannot influence your
behavior -and armed with DVRs, neither of us watches commercials,
and free TV vanishes. If we measure the copyright fair use right
against the prior baseline established by Sony-under which homerecording was allowed and fast-forwarding through commercials went
uncontrolled-SONICblue should prevail on the copyright claims
tied to commercial skipping; DVR commercial skipping is just a handier way of exercising these Sony "rights." That said, if we really take
fair use analysis as open-ended economic analysis, the prisoners' dilemma problem of commercials and free TV suggests that we will not
necessarily reach the best joint outcome if we allow individuals to
make choices on their own. Only something more collective (or more
centralized) would get us to preserving the commercials.
Thus there might be a collective interest in limiting individuals'
ability to eliminate commercials. Eliminating commercials is an attempt to escape the tax that those commercials represent. In a world
of ubiquitous removal technology, we move television commercial
viewing from opt out to opt in. With decentralized TiVo, the technology threatens a mandatory shift from an advertising-based medium to
a fee-based medium. Moving the intelligence away from the edges of
the network to the center preserves the possibility that users can
commit to not deleting the commercials. With DVR services provided
centrally, each TV watcher could choose whether to pay one fee for
ad-free content or a different fee for content with ads.
C.

Ad Personalization and Changes to Content

But we should expect more than just successful pass-through of
some commercials to viewers. That does no more than continue the
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current state of ad-supported television. The possible attractiveness of
inserting an intelligent intermediary between the over-the-air broadcaster and the television viewer should be apparent. Such an intermediary could deliver to viewers commercials that are tailored for those
viewers. In the current regime, commercials are matched with viewers
in a relatively clunky fashion. As an advertiser, I know that a particular kind of viewer watches Friends.I deliver commercials based upon
those aggregate views, but if it turns out that the odd grandmother
watches the show to better relate to her grandchildren, we have
probably delivered the wrong ads to her. Far better-far more valuable-to have the intermediary know that Grandma is watching and
match commercials to her. This is not to say, of course, that Grandma
or any other viewer actually welcomes the advertising but that a
viewer finds the interruption less costly when useful information is
presented.
As I noted in the Introduction, ad personalization should make
commercials much more effective and might be expected to reduce
the number of commercials broadcast. The extent to which that will
occur depends on precisely how much information the DVR sees and
uses, and there is little doubt that concerns over the privacy of information will be a key issue for ad personalization and a natural action
point for lawmakers.
But successful ad personalization will also change content itself.
To see this, consider a simple example. One show can be broadcast: a
hockey game or a game show. Viewer A will watch only hockey, while
viewers B and C will watch only the game show. Only one commercial
can be broadcast on the show (viewers do not care about one commercial, but find any more infinitely painful). Three advertisers compete for the single slot. The beer company would pay $5 to reach A
and nothing to reach B or C. The coffee seller would pay $3 to reach
B and nothing to reach A or C. The tea maker would pay $3 to reach
C and nothing to reach A or B.
In an ad-supported environment, which show will be broadcast
with what commercial? Hockey with the beer commercial. We can run
only one commercial, and the most valuable commercial is the beer
commercial. Now suppose that we can tailor commercials: how will
this alter the outcome? The TV station will now broadcast the game
show and will show the coffee commercial to B and the tea commercial to C. Total ad revenue will increase from $5 to $6.
Ad personalization has the capacity to change TV content, as the
simple example should make clear. I have said nothing about whether
this is good or bad, just that it is possible. Also note that we can now
support more TV programs. If the cost of producing the game show or
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the hockey game was $5.50, without ad personalization we would get
neither show; with ad personalization, we can pay for the game show.
CONCLUSION

We are now positioned to guess at how we will regulate DVR
technology. The emergence of the DVR as a free-standing device has
put us on the wrong track. As a free-standing device, we will replay
the Sony litigation and have another fight over copyright. As a 5-4
pre-digital era decision early in the days of ubiquitous copy technology, it makes sense to rethink Sony and see whether we want to end
up in the same spot. I doubt it, but that is not my issue here. Instead,
as the DVR technology is incorporated into the devices we already
use to deliver intermediated TV-cable and satellite set-top boxeswe will regulate DVR technology incrementally as part of the larger
regulation of cable and satellite broadcasting.
In that framework, the key idea has been pass-through: in varying
degrees, the TV intermediary is required to pass through the content
of the over-the-air broadcaster with the commercials intact. The copyright statutory licensing scheme implemented one version of passthrough, the must-carry rules a slightly different version, and a third
version can be required as a matter of contract under retransmission
consent. The key doctrinal question will be whether these passthrough rules limit the ability of TV intermediaries to incorporate
DVR technologies. Is the cable company complying with its mustcarry obligation to broadcast the full content of the local station, including the commercials, if viewers can use the set-top box to delete
those commercials?
I have not attempted to answer that doctrinal question here. The
answer to that question will establish the property right to the delivery of the commercials and the baseline against which negotiations
will take place for broadcasters who elect the retransmission consent
process. But to some extent, I think that the answer to the doctrinal
question is of limited importance, as it applies only to ad-supported
broadcast channels. Competition from ad-supported cable channels
will matter. For ad-supported cable, the cable operators will rely on
contract to move toward ad personalization. The cable company contracts upward with content creators and downward with customers
and, through this nexus of contracts and control over technology, can
establish terms of use directly, making copyright largely irrelevant. If
this model turns out to be a much better way of delivering ads, we will
see a substantial advantage for ad-supported cable over broadcast TV.
For broadcasters, the issue will not be about fighting to get their ads
to viewers intact but rather one of getting access, possibly through the
retransmission consent process, to the ad personalization technology
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made possible by the insertion of intelligence and storage into the settop box.

